Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia - Historical Book on Russian Revolution & WWI - Perfect for History Buffs, Students & Researchers

Here, a year after The Sleepwalkers and the other chronicles of the July Crisis and "Why World War I?", is a genuinely brilliant and convincing analysis. And, most of all, NEW (at least to anglophone readers). The question the book analyzes is somewhat broader than the ostensible topic of "Why did the Russian empire/aristocracy and Romanov dynasty take what in retrospect looks like a suicidal plunge into war against Germany?'What Lieven asks us to do is look at the war, its origins and its conclusion from a central and eastern european perspective. The war was indeed a war of choice for the UK. But his view is that so long as Germany won in the east it could afford a draw in the West. Had the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which gave Germany a free hand in the east except for the Russian core, not been negated by the ability of the US, UK and France to actually defeat Germany in the west, Germany would have "won".But the main point of the book, I think, is an answer to those historians who take the "sleepwalker" view in one way or another. It is true that many decision-makers thought it would be a short war. But there were many informed voices at the top -- Kitchener in the UK, Bethmann in Berlin, and not least Franz Josef and Nicholas II -- who knew it would not be a Franco-Prussian style short surgical war, but an all-in conflict in which the survival of a society and a ruling class would be at stake. They were not "sleepwalking".Rather, Lieven points, they were all acting rationally within the limits of their view of their military/economic positions, their domestic political constraints and their social outlook. Germany believed, as did Russian policy-makers, that it was destined to struggle for mastery over east-central europe and the Ukraine with Russia; and that the French-financed modernization of Russia's armed forces and industrial base meant that Germany's then-current (as of 1914) advantage over Russia would diminish with every passing year. Russia, having tried an failed to expand in the Far East but being disastrously defeated by Japan in 1905, which caused an internal revolution which the Tsar and ruling class only barely survived, could only look west and south to Constantinople. Whatever loyalty the Russian rulers could call on from the ruled rested on military prestige and on Slav solidarity. Lieven believes that for Russia to have failed to come to the defense of Serbia after having backed down twice before since 1905 in previous Balkan crises would have cost Nicholas his throne, in any event. So, when confronted with Austria's thrust towards Serbia in July 1914, and Germany's apparent backing of it, Nicholas -- after hesitating -- did the rational thing. There was a risk Tsardom would end if he went to war, but a big risk the same would happen if it he didn't. Here, Lieven makes emphasizes a point anglophones sometimes forget about how close to toppling the Romanovs the 1905 revolution came. (He also makes one believe Nicholas II was much more well-informed and sensible than anglophone historians make him out to be. He was certainly ill-served by the cumbrous Russian government apparatus, but he was constrained by domestic politics, which were pre-revolutionary in nature.)(To complete the "why war?" analysis, Austria believed the survival of its multi-ethnic empire depended on neutralizing what it considered theSerbian threat to its Balkan empire, the Balkans being the only place Austria-Hungary could control once it was clear (as it was after 1870) thata pivot to Germany would mean becoming a Prussian satellite. France had no choice given the Schlieffen plan. The UK is the only power where there is, I think, a real question "why?".)Finally, as to details of the July Crisis -- the "blank check", the Austrian ultimatum, the mobilization timetables, the miscommunication between civilian and military authorities in Berlin, Sazonov and Pourtales and Hoyos and so on, all the material so well covered in last years crop of books --Lieven treats all this with a convincing view from a height. Germany and Austria were deluded if they actually thought Russia would stay out of a Balkan war. (As Germany was deluded in willing itself to believe England might stay out of a French war.) Had Germany forced Austria to back down over Serbia, Russia would have had no reason to go to war, true; but this didn't happen (or, if it came close to happening, happened much too late in time).Lieven is a clear but not a flashy writer (and he has written one of the funniest footnotes in any serious history book I have read in the last decade). The Russian and central-europe perspective he brings is invaluable.Students of the causes of "The Great War" (WWI) have long waited for a fuller account of Russia's actions and concerns leading to the outbreak of WWI.Unfortunately, readers will be disappointed in this book. First, it is inexcusable that a book about the causes of WWI which centered on which country controlled the Balkan nations does not contain a single map. How helpful it would have been had the author provided maps at various dates of the European countries, particularly the Balkan nations, Serbia, Bulgaria etc. The flame that caused the conflagration of WII was lit by the assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand by a Serbian on June 28, 1914.Admittedly the author is dealing with an immensely complicated subject but he makes it more difficult to understand with his endless mini-bio portraits of the actors which he calls "the decision makers." These individuals have, long passed from memory and page after page about thesethem confuses the narrative and makes for difficult reading.There are, however, a number of observations about Russia which were new to me. Russia was so large that it could not be effectively governed with the tools then available. In addition, it had been seriously weakened both financially and militarily by its defeat in the Russo-Japaneses war of 1905 and the nearly successful revolution in the same year. By 1914 it was on the way to recovery but not sufficiently to match the economic strength of England, France or Germany.What Russia needed was peace almost at any price..Austria was a declining power wracked by internal ethnic divisions between the Hungarians and the Germans. It too needed peach but it was less careful about keeping it due to its overriding concern and fear of the Balkans. The author agrees with other commentators that Austria was primarily responsible for WWI but it would not have acted with the backing of Germany.Among the recurring themes of the book is the conflict between nationalism and empire building. The were basically antithetical forces which let to numerous crises leading up to WWI. Nicholas II does not fare well with the author nor with other authors as well. He was not very bright, not sympathetic to a constitutional monarchy and should have been to reign rather than rule.Finally, a minor point is that the author did not see fit to include a biography depending on copious and less accessible end notes instead. A bibliography would certainly have contained: "Cataclysm The First World War," by David Stevenson and "The War that Ended Peace - The Road to 1914," by Margaret Macmillan.Both books have previously been favorably reviewed by me on Amazon.I found a previous book by same author very readable and a product of meticulous research, and this title is no exceptionI have been reading Russian history in order to "fill in" a major gap in my knowledge. I found this book very helpful! When considering the origins of World War I, many books posit a rolling domino effect from the assassination of Arch Duke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. When I was a kid, I had read Jessica Tuchman's Guns of August and thought, "Well, that's interesting and compelling." (It was.) Lieven's book looks at the origins of WW I from three levels--geopolitical, emerging nationalism, and social/personal (mass media and the individuals involved). He posits that control of the Balkans and Ukraine was a central element in the movement toward war, coupled with Russia's loss to Japan in 1905, Russia's 1905 revolution, the need for industrialization, and the false belief in the loyalty of the peasants and generosity of the aristocracy. I found this quite interesting, and it supplements what I had read in Solzhenitsyn's Red Wheel, and Doestoevsky's Demons.At times, the three-level analysis was hard reading, but I thought the effort required was well worth the results.Excellent analysis of the underlying reasons that led to the outbreak of WW1, focusing on the Russian perspective. D. Lieven thoroughly analyses the various objectives, strategies and motives from the perspectives of the key Russian decision makers - starting from the Tsar himself, the Duma, the military and gives esp wide room to the views of the Russian ambassadors in the main European capitals Belgrad, Vienna, Paris, Berlin and London. In detail he explains the role of the Pan-Slavian movement, the importance of the 'Straits' (in this case mainly the Bosporus) and the importance of the Ukrainian question for the Russian Empire. Too many the outbreak of war in 2014 was inevitable. Lieven, however, illustrates convincingly that there was - at least from a Russian perspective - a real alternative to the geo-political path chosen by the Russian elite: by entering the German-Habsburgian alliance which may have been much more in Russia's interest as esp German interests were not very overlapping and conflictual with the Russians. Thought provoking also the parallels Lieven draws to the geo-political situation today at the end of his book - history may not exactly repeat itself, but important to learn from the catastrophic errors and poor judgement undertaken by the great European great powers 100 years ago. Best account of underlying causes that led to WW1 I have come across so far.As a child of the middle 1900's I was interested in how and why the Russian State started and developed.There is a lot of detail and as a reference book can be useful but, I found it difficult reading when the narrative jumps between different dates, often 10 years apart. Very confusing.Brilliant work, i agree with the main thesis that Ukraine is the centre of the cause. Interesting now how over 100 yrs later it still is. A timely read, as histroy likes returning to points of intersect.This man can do nor wrong! After his splendid work on the Russian Napoleonic army I thought this might be worth a read - and it certainly was. Lieven has that rare knack of being able to write serious military history and keeping it interesting and even exciting. It is a fascinating era, to me anyway, and I have ploughed through books on the tiopic which were a struggle. This one is a pleasure.It is all too easy to assume that Russia was ruled by a clique of self-perpetuating dunderheads in the years that led to WWI and the Revolution. This lucidly written book makes it clear that this was quite untrue, that the options facing the country were as wide and diverse as the country itself. Could the catastrophe of war and revolution have been avoided, given the volatile conditions of Russia's neighbours; almost certainly not, and this is about as good an explanation of why as you will ever get.